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Abstract
We consider a model of socially interacting individuals that make a binary choice in a
context of positive additive endogenous externalities. It encompasses as particular cases
several models from the sociology and economics literature. We extend previous results
to the case of a general distribution of idiosyncratic preferences, called here Idiosyncratic
Willingnesses to Pay (IWP).
Positive additive externalities yield a family of inverse demand curves that include the
classical downward sloping ones but also new ones with non constant convexity. When j,
the ratio of the social influence strength to the standard deviation of the IWP distribution,
is small enough, the inverse demand is a classical monotonic (decreasing) function of the
adoption rate. Even if the IWP distribution is mono-modal, there is a critical value of j
above which the inverse demand is non monotonic, decreasing for small and high adoption
rates, but increasing within some intermediate range. Depending on the price there are
thus either one or two equilibria.
Beyond this first result, we exhibit the generic properties of the boundaries limiting
the regions where the system presents different types of equilibria (unique or multiple).
These properties are shown to depend only on qualitative features of the IWP distribution:
modality (number of maxima), smoothness and type of support (compact or infinite). The
main results are summarized as phase diagrams in the space of the model parameters, on
which the regions of multiple equilibria are precisely delimited.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Modeling social influences with heterogeneous agents
There are many circumstances in social and economic contexts where, faced with different
alternatives, the best choice for an individual depends on the choices of other individuals in the
population. The decision of leaving a neighborhood [78], to attend a seminar [78] or a crowded
bar [2, 3], to participate to collective actions such as strikes and riots [46], are particular
examples taken from social sciences. It has been suggested that social interactions may explain
the school dropout [24], the persistence in the educational level within some neighborhoods [30]
and the related consequences in the stratification of investment in human capital and economic
segregation [11], the large dispersion in urban crime through cities with similar characteristics
[42], the emergence of social norms [71], the labor market behavior and related unemployment
patterns [88, 86], the housing demand [96], the existence of poverty traps [34], the smoking
behavior [56, 55, 83], etc.
Similarly, there is a growing economic literature that recognizes the influence on consumers
of the social world they live in. In market situations like the subscription to a telephone
network [5, 75, 90, 25] or the choice of a computer operating system [52], the willingness to
pay generally depends not only on the individual preferences but also on the choice made by
others [81, 76]. If the externality is positive the utility of the most popular choice increases even
for individuals who otherwise would never make this choice. In other words, the conformity
effect may dominate the heterogeneity of preferences, as pointed out by Bernheim [12]. General
aspects of these issues have been discussed in the literature [10, 60]. Particular insightful papers
are Becker’s note [9] about restaurants pricing, and the qualitative analysis by Granoveter and
Soong [47] of the consequences of interpersonal influences (“bandwagon effects”[57, 76]) on the
consumers demand and on the supply prices.
In the present paper we consider the general properties of a model of socially interacting
heterogeneous individuals that make a binary choice in a context of positive endogenous ex-
ternalities. The model encompasses, as particular cases, most of the above mentioned models
presented in the sociology and economics literature. In a forthcoming paper [44] we explore the
consequences of the externalities on the economy, taking as an example the simplest market,
i.e. that of a monopolist pricing a single good.
In social sciences, the question of discrete (typically binary) choices with heterogeneous
agents and positive externalities has been first addressed in the 70’s by Schelling [77, 78], who
borrowed from Physics the concept of critical mass: in a repeated-decisions setting, depending
on whether this critical mass is or not reached, the system may end up at very different equi-
libria. Granovetter further develops Schelling’s model, applying it to particular problems such
as joining or not a riot [46], voting, etc [47]. The same topic is reconsidered within a statis-
tical physics point of view in the early 80’s by Galam et al [39]. The notion of critical mass
is then related to the Physics concept of phase transition at a critical point, in the neighbor-
hood of which the system may be extremely susceptible: by tipping effects, small microscopic
changes can lead to drastic changes at the macroscopic level. Similar tools have been applied
in 1980 by Kindermann and Snell [53] to the study of social networks. These authors intro-
duced into the sociology and economics literature the equivalence between statistical physics
approaches —that use the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution— and Markov Random Fields. An-
other physically-inspired approach for modeling social phenomena such as opinion diffusion
has been developed by Weidlich and Haag [93, 92] in 1983, through a master equation and
the Fokker-Planck approximation. Later, these physically inspired models of opinion contagion
have been exploited in economics by Orle´an [69, 70] for the analysis of mimetic behaviors in
the context of financial markets. There is now a large and growing literature on opinion and
innovation diffusion (see e.g. [89, 49, 26, 91, 84]) closely related to the general discrete choice
3
model considered in this paper. Since the beginning of the 90’s the general framework of social
interactions in non-market contexts is reconsidered in a Beckerian way [8, 10], in particular by
Glaeser et al [41, 42, 40].
The first application of statistical mechanics approaches in economics may be traced back
to the pioneering work of Fo¨lmer [36]. Introducing an economic interpretation of the Ising
model of ferromagnetism at finite temperature, he shows that strong externalities may hinder
the stabilization of an economy. These models introduce Markov random fields (equivalently
Boltzmann-Gibbs distributions) to model uncertainty in the decision making process, allowing
for the definition of a general equilibrium concept. According to Fo¨lmer, Hildebrand’s [48] justi-
fication of the representative agent approach breaks down when agents’ decisions are correlated
due to their social interactions (for a discussion, see also [54]).
A renewal of interest for models of binary decisions with externalities arose in economics
in the 90’s. On one side, Durlauf and collaborators [27, 28, 29, 30] and Kirman and Weis-
buch [94] among others, consider agents that choose an action according to a Boltzmann-Gibbs
distribution, that is a logistic choice function, reflecting some random aspects in the agent’s
utility. In this context Brock [19] and Blume [13, 14] explicit the links between Game Theory
and Statistical Mechanics, while Kirman and coworkers [67] show that the logistic choice func-
tion may be seen as resulting from an exploration-exploitation compromise. These and other
recent papers [4, 31, 32, 20, 21, 40, 95, 35, 45, 65, 16] analyze with statistical physics tools the
consequences of positive social (market and non-market) interactions in the aggregate behavior
of large populations (for a short introduction to statistical physics approaches see [43] and for
their application to economics see [72]; see also [7] for a survey). Most of the above mentioned
authors restrict the analysis of the model to the case where all the individuals have the same
idiosyncratic preference. Heterogeneity in the population is introduced through the probabilis-
tic decision-making process (random utility model [58, 59]), like in Fo¨lmer’s work [36]. Then,
the actual equilibrium reached by the system depends on the fixed points of the decision dy-
namics, generally a myopic best reply. An interesting characteristic of these models is that they
present multiple equilibria for some range of the parameters. Becker [9] pointed out important
consequences of these multiple equilibria, induced by externalities, on the economy: he suggests
that they could be the reason of seemingly suboptimal pricing in situations of persistent excess
demand.
In this paper we consider intrinsically heterogeneous agents with fixed utilities, like in Mc-
Fadden’s approach to Quantal Choice models [62, 63]. Each individual has an Idiosyncratic
Willingness to Pay (IWP) that remains fixed on time. We mainly (but not exclusively) decline
the model within a market context, in which the binary choice corresponds to buying or not a
given good at a posted price. This general setting allows us to generalize Becker’s qualitative
analysis [9] of the optimal pricing problem. Putting the price to zero allows us to recover the
social sciences models. We assume that these IWP are random variables that are distributed
among the population according to a given probability density function (pdf).
We determine the possible equilibria of the system without assuming any precise decision-
making dynamics. We show that the model’s properties depend on the strength of the ex-
ternality and on qualitative properties of the IWP pdf, like its modality class (the number
of maxima), its smoothness properties and the kind of support. We display the main results
on a plane whose axes are the parameters of the model, namely, the average IWP and the
strength of the social component, both measured in units of the standard deviation of the IWP
distribution. Particular cases of our model have been published elsewhere [66, 45]. This paper
extends those result to the case of a general IWP distribution. The particularly important case
of a uni-modal pdf (with a single maximum) is thoroughly studied, but we also discuss the
consequences of multi-modality. Our results are summarized on phase diagrams, that is, we
plot in the parameters space the boundaries of the regions where different types of solutions
exist.
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Before entering into the details of our approach (section 2) we discuss the analogies and
differences between our model and other models of social interactions (section 1.2) and we
summarize our main results (section 1.3).
1.2 More on related models
In this section we briefly discuss the relationship between the model to be considered here
and other models studied in the literature. Let us first consider models of discrete choices
in the absence of externalities. According to the typology proposed by Anderson et al. [1],
within the general framework of Random Utility Models (RUM)[58, 59] with additive stochastic
utilities, there are two distinct approaches to individual choices: a “psychological” one and an
“economic” one. In the psychological perspective (Thurstone [87], Luce [58]) the randomness is a
time-dependent i.i.d. random variable: the random components of the idiosyncratic preferences
are assumed to be independently drawn afresh by each individual from a given pdf, each time
the choice has to be made. They are interpreted as individual temporary changes, or mistakes
in the estimated utilities. In the simplest case —actually, the only one treated in the social
and economic literature— the agents IWPs have identical deterministic parts and only differ
by this random time-varying term which is systematically assumed to be drawn from a logistic
pdf. In practice many approaches like in [20] consider the choice rule as deriving from a random
utility model [58]. As shown by McFadden [62], in this context the logistic form is obtained if
the random terms in the underlying Thurstone’s discriminant process are i.i.d. Weibull random
variables, i.e. have a double exponential (extreme value, type I) distribution (see also [1]).
In the presence of strategic complementarities ([22, 23]), the resulting model is well known
in statistical physics: it corresponds to the standard Ising model, i.e. with ferromagnetic in-
teractions and annealed disorder, that is, at finite temperature T . The latter is the inverse of
the standard logistic parameter β ≡ 1/T and is thus proportional to the standard deviation of
the IWP distribution. The ferromagnetic interaction constant J corresponds to the strength
of the social externality. Introduced by Fo¨lmer [36] in the economics context, this standard
Ising model has recently been reconsidered in the social and economic literature mainly by
Durlauf and coworkers [31, 32, 20, 21] and by Kirman and Weisbuch [94, 67]. The correspond-
ing equilibria are reminiscent of the Quantal Response Equilibria [64] used in the context of
experimental economics and behavioral game theory. These are equilibria “on the average”,
in the statistical sense (as in Physics): they do not correspond to the strict maximization of
the utilities (that are random variables) but to that of their estimated or expected values. In
the generally considered infinite population limit (where the variance of the expected values
vanishes) the expected utilities are systematically smaller that the maximal ones.
The standard Ising model is quite well understood [85]. Ising himself [51] gave an analytic
description of its properties in the simplest case of a linear chain where each agent interacts only
with his right and left nearest neighbors. There is also an analytical description of the stationary
states of the model, due to Onsager [68], in the case where the agents are situated on the vertices
of a 2-dimensional square lattice, each having four neighbors. However, no analytic results exist
for arbitrary neighborhoods except for the specific case of a global neighborhood, known as the
mean field approximation in Physics. Accordingly, considering global neighborhoods, Brock and
Durlauf [20] analyze the properties of the expected demand in the case of rational expectations
under the assumption of a logistic distribution of such expectations (assuming thus double
exponential random utilities). They find, in agreement with standard results in statistical
mechanics [85], that there exist either one, two or three solutions for the demand function,
depending on the relative magnitudes of the idiosyncratic uniform social term, the variance of
the stochastic term and the strength of the social effects.
In the following we adopt instead McFadden’s [62] economic approach (see also [59, 1]):
we assume that each agent has a willingness to pay invariable in time, that is different from
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one agent to the other. In statistical physics this heterogeneity is called quenched disorder.
The particular model we study is analogous to the ferromagnetic Random Field Ising Model
(RFIM) at zero temperature (corresponding to the fact that the agents make deterministic
choices). Thus, our modeling approach assumes the so called “risky” situation: an external
observer (e.g. a seller) does not have access to the individual preferences, but may know their
probability distribution. According to McFadden, “Thurstone’s construction is appealing to an
economist because the assumption that a single subject will draw independent utility functions
in repeated choice settings and then proceed to maximize them is formally equivalent to a model
in which the experimenter draws individuals randomly from a population with differing, but
fixed, utility functions, and offers each a single choice; the latter model is consistent with the
classical postulates of economic rationality” ([63], p 365). However, in the presence of social
interactions this statement is in general incorrect. In a repeated choice setting, individual
utilities evolve in time according to the others’ decisions. In fact, the equilibria of systems
reached through a dynamics that corresponds to an iterated game where agents make myopic
choices at each time-step is one of the main concerns of statistical physics. It is known that
the equilibria of systems with annealed or quenched disorder are of very different nature. The
time average on a single agent and the population average at a given time do not necessarily
coincide.
In contrast to the standard Ising model at finite temperature (annealed disorder), the prop-
erties of the RFIM with externalities, both at zero and at finite temperatures, are far from being
fully understood. The properties of quenched disordered systems have been and are still the
subject of numerous studies. Since the first studies of the RFIM, which date back to Aharony
and Galam [38, 37], a number of important results have been published in the physics literature
on this model (see e. g. [80]). Several variants of the RFIM have already been used in the
context of socio-economic modeling, both by physicists and economists [39, 70, 18, 95].
The quenched-utilities model (RFIM at zero temperature) and the annealed-disorder model
(standard mean field Ising model at finite temperature) have the same aggregate behavior
(i.e. demand function for the market case) and equilibria under the following conditions - but
essentially only under such conditions:
1. the choice function with annealed utilities is identical to the cumulative distribution of
the quenched IWPs;
2. in the annealed case, equilibrium is reached through repeated best reply choices, where
the expected demand is myopically estimated;
3. the population size is infinite, guaranteeing that the variance of the demand vanishes in
both models.
However, the economic interpretation of these equilibria are very different: in the case of
quenched utilities these are standard Nash equilibria, while in the case of annealed utilities
these are similar (although not identical) to Quantal Response equilibria.
1.3 Main specific results
In the present paper we determine the equilibrium properties in the case of a global neighborhood
with time invariant (quenched) random utilities, in the limit of an infinite number of agents.
Since our paper focuses on equilibrium (static) properties, the social influence depends on the
actual choices of the neighbors, in contrast with [20], where the social influence in the surplus
function depends on the agent’s expected demand.
Previous studies using annealed or quenched utilities consider specific probability distribu-
tions, mostly a logistic or a Gaussian [87]. Some papers have determined conditions on the
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choice function for having multi-equilibria [67, 40]. From the Physics literature we expect that
specific properties near a critical point (a bifurcation point, see Section 3.2.1 below) are inde-
pendent of the details of the model: this is used in [80] for describing the hysteresis effects in
a family of (physical) systems at such a critical point, and exploited in [65] for the analysis of
empirical socio-economic data in cases where the actual pdfs are not known. However, the full
description of the phase diagram for an arbitrary pdf has not been done yet. Here we present
this detailed analysis for a typical probability distribution of the IWP. We show how uniqueness
or multiplicity of equilibria, related to convexity properties of the inverse demand functions,
result from modality and smoothness of the pdf, as well as from the strength of the externality.
We show that for small enough strengths of the social influence (the case of moderate social
influence in [40]), the demand has a classical shape, that is, with a continuous decreasing
adoption rate for increasing prices. However, if the ratio between the social influence strength
and the standard deviation of the IWP distribution exceeds a critical value, the inverse demand
function exhibits a non-classical, non-monotonic, behavior. As a result, depending on the price,
there are either one or two stable equilibria for the demand: the positive (additive) externalities
in a market context may give raise to a family of non-monotonic demand curves generalizing
thus the classical ones.
Beyond this first main result, we exhibit the generic properties of the boundaries limiting
the regions where the system presents different types of equilibria (unique or multiple). We
call these properties generic since we show that they depend only on qualitative features of
the IWP distribution: modality (number of maxima), smoothness (continuity and derivability
properties) and type of support (compact or infinite). The main results are summarized as
phase diagrams in the space of the relevant parameters of the model, namely (i) the social
influence strength and (ii) the difference between the population average of the IWP and the
posted price, both parameters conveniently normalized by the standard deviation of the IWP
distribution (which measures the importance of the heterogeneity).
1.4 Organization of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model: we first (section 2.1)
specify the agents (customers) model, then in 2.2 we introduce a normalized form of the basic
equations which is convenient for analyzing the demand, and in 2.3 we show on two simple
extreme cases what to expect from these equations. In 2.4 we detail the families of probability
distributions of the IWP covered by this paper.
In Section 3 we analyze the aggregate demand (its collective behavior) for a generic smooth
pdf. In 3.1 we introduce and study the direct and inverse demand functions; the demand
phase diagram is derived in Section 3.2: in 3.2.1 we obtain the domain of multiple solutions
which allows to plot the phase diagram (section 3.2.3). We analyze in details the vicinity of
the bifurcation point (section 3.2.4) and the question of Pareto optimality (section 3.2.5). A
summary of the demand properties is given in 3.3.
We leave to the Appendix A the analysis of other kinds of pdfs, where we study the demand
phase diagrams of IWP distributions with compact support (section A.1) and with fat tails
(section A.2). The demand phase diagram for a pdf with an arbitrary number of maxima is
studied in A.3 —in details for a smooth multimodal pdf in Section A.3.1, and on a simple
example of singular bimodal distribution in section A.3.2—.
Finally we summarize the main results and give several perspectives for further research in
Section 4.
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2 Model of discrete choices with heterogeneous agents
and positive externalities
2.1 Agents model
We consider a population of N agents (i = 1, 2, . . . , N). Each individual i has to make a binary
choice. Depending on the context, this binary decision may represent the fact of buying or
not a good, adopting or not a given standard, adopting or not some social behavior such as
joining a riot [46], or a journal club [77], [78], etc. Formally each agent i must choose a strategy
ωi in the strategic set Ω = {0, 1} (ωi = 1 denotes to buy/adopt/join, ωi = 0 otherwise)1.
Hereafter, without loss of generality, we will refer to the simplest market situation where the
agents are customers who must choose whether to buy or not a single good at a price P . Our
main concern is with the agents’ behaviors, and P is considered as an exogenous parameter
—e.g. it is posted by a monopolist selling the good—. Non-market models like those recently
considered by, i.e., Glaeser et al. [40] are obtained by setting P = 0 or by considering P as an
exogenous social cost, common to all the agents. We are interested in the collective outcome of
the agents decisions. In a following paper [44] focusing on the market context we will analyze
the consequences of the customers collective behavior on a monopolist’s program for fixing the
optimal price.
The population is heterogeneous. Each individual i has an idiosyncratic preference or will-
ingness to pay/adopt (hereafter IWP) Hi, meaning that in the absence of social influences, an
agent i adopts the state ωi = 1 if Hi is larger than the price P . Following Mc-Fadden [62] and
Manski [59], we work within the framework of Random Utility Models (RUM): we assume that
the Hi are time independent random variables independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
in the population. Denoting by H the mean and by σ the variance of the IWP distribution,
hereafter we assume that the random variable (Hi −H)/σ is distributed according to:
P(x < Hi −H
σ
< x+ dx) = f(x)dx, (1)
so that f is a pdf with zero mean and unitary variance. In the RUM view point, the agents
have utilities H0i and H
1
i for not adopting and adopting respectively, with H
0 and H1 the
corresponding population averages. For k = 0, 1, one writes Hki = H
k + ki , where 
k
i are
independent random variables with zero mean and standard deviation σk, with not necessarily
identical pdfs for k = 0 and k = 1. Then in our model we have Hi = H1i −H0i , H = H1 −H0
and f is the pdf of the normalized difference xi = (1i − 0i )/σ, with σ2 = (σ0)2 + (σ1)2 because
of the additivity of the variances of independent variables. As particular examples, if ki are
Gaussian variables, then xi is also Gaussian; if ki are uniformly distributed on, say the intervals
[−ak, ak], then xi has a trapezoidal pdf, which becomes a triangular distribution if e.g. a0 = 0
(no uncertainty in the utility of not adopting). In the following we do not assume any specific
form of the pdf of x. In Section 2.4 below, we present in details the class of pdfs considered in
this paper.
If all the individuals had the same IWP, the outcome in absence of social interactions would
be very simple: either the price is below this common value, and everybody buys, or it is above it
and nobody buys. All the individuals would behave in the same way, obtaining the same payoffs,
and in the market aggregate analysis, they may be replaced by a fictitious representative agent
[54]. In the case of a heterogeneous population considered here, only the agents with Hi ≥ P
would buy at price P , but getting different payoffs.
The situation is more complex when the decision of each agent depends also on the decisions
of others ([59] and references therein). We assume that each agent is the more willing to pay
1Some authors use the notation si = 1 and si = −1; both encodings are equivalent: it suffices to replace
ωi = (si + 1)/2 in our model and identify the coefficients of corresponding expressions.
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the larger the number of buyers in the population. We consider a linear separable surplus, that
is if agent i buys at the posted price P , his surplus is
Si = Hi + Jη − P, (2)
where η is the fraction of buyers in the population. Taking into account the definition of ωi:
η ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
ωi. (3)
We assume also that the externality Jη corresponds to strategic complementarities, i.e. that
the strength of the social influence is positive: J > 0 2.
The actual surplus of agent i is:
Wi = Si ωi. (4)
In order to maximize his surplus, agent i should buy/adopt (ωi = 1) if Si > 0, but not (ωi = 0)
when Si < 0. Since the IWP are i.i.d., when N is very large (more precisely, in the limit
N →∞), by the law of large numbers, the fraction of buyers (3) —which is the average of ωi—
converges to the expected value of ωi over the IWP distribution. Thus, η is given by the fixed
point equation:
η = P(Hi − P + Jη > 0). (5)
The marginal customer m, indifferent between adopting or not, is defined by the condition of
zero surplus, Sm = 0:
Hm − P + Jη = 0 (6)
so that (5) may be written as
η = P(Hi > Hm). (7)
For what follows it is more useful to write (5) as
η = P(Hi −H > −S) (8)
where
S = S(J,H, P ; η) ≡ H − P + Jη (9)
is the population average of the (ex ante) surplus Si. It depends on the parameters J and H,
which are properties of the customers population, and P , the exogenous price.
Notation. Generally, upon manipulating functions, we put in parenthesis the parameters
in front, separated with a semicolon (;) from what we consider the variable. Our notation
S(J,H, P ; η) in (9) indicates that J , H and P are considered as parameters, whereas η is the
variable. Sometimes, when the context is clear, we drop down the parameters and keep only
the variable, writing thus S(η). Whenever we consider functions of two variables, they are
separated by a simple colon, like in equations (37) and (38), and in Appendix A.3.
2More generally, the social term may be proportional to the fraction of buyers in an individual-depending
subset of the population, called “neighbors” of agent i. In this paper, we consider a global neighborhood, where
every agent has social connections with every other agent, mainly because this case can be studied analytically.
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2.2 Aggregate behavior: normalized equations
Clearly, the fraction of buyers η depends on the strength of the social influence J , the price
P and the average willingness to pay in the population H, and on the distribution of the
deviation of the IWP Hi from its population average H. The agents choices depend only on
the surplus sign, and they are invariant under changes of the surplus scale. Since the surplus is
linear, we can formally multiply every term of the surplus by a same strictly positive number
without changing the agents’ choices. An adequate scale is given by the typical scale of the
IWP distribution: it is convenient to measure each quantity (J,H, P ) in units of the width σ of
the IWP pdf. Hence instead of four parameters, we are left with three independent parameters.
Hereafter we will thus work with the following normalized variables
j ≡ J
σ
, h ≡ H
σ
, p ≡ P
σ
(10)
In addition, as it is obvious from equations (8) and (9), η depends on the price P and the
average willingness to pay H only through their difference H−P . We introduce the normalized
difference:
δ ≡ H − P
σ
= h− p, (11)
which is the average ex-ante surplus in the absence of externality. For short hereafter we call δ
the bare surplus. In non-market models (p = 0) it is the average willingness to adopt.
Remark. In (almost) all the following we will work with the above reduced variables (10),
(11), referring to them as the (normalized) strength of social influence, average willingness to
pay, price, and bare surplus. However one should keep in mind, especially when interpreting the
results, that they represent the ratios of the non normalized parameters to the width of the IWP
distribution. Clearly other normalizations are possible. An alternative of particular interest is
the normalization obtained by measuring every quantity in units of the social strength J : the
relevant parameters are then
σ˜ ≡ σ
J
, h˜ ≡ H
J
, p˜ ≡ P
J
, δ˜ ≡ H − P
J
= h˜− p˜ (12)
(equivalently one can do as if J = 1). Note that this choice of normalization is no more than an
equivalent representation of the parameters space; indeed one has σ˜ = 1/j, h˜ = h/j, p˜ = p/j.
It is also interesting to analyze the results in term of the set of parameters (12), which allow to
stress the model properties as a function of the degree of heterogeneity (relative to the strength
of the social influence) —a homogeneous population corresponding to the limiting case σ˜ = 0,
a highly heterogeneous one to a large σ˜—.
With the normalized variables (10), (11), equation (8) becomes
η =
∫ ∞
−s
f(x)dx = 1− F (−s), (13)
where F is the cumulative probability distribution and s = S/σ, with S defined by (9), depends
on h and p through the bare surplus δ, that is
s = s(j, δ; η) ≡ δ + jη. (14)
If the pdf has infinite support,
F (−s) ≡ P(x ≤ −s) =
∫ −s
−∞
f(x)dx. (15)
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In the case of a compact support [xm, xM ], one can write:
η = 1− F (−s) =
∫ max{xM ,−s}
max{xm,−s}
f(x)dx. (16)
Obviously, when −s < xm, we have η = 1, and when −s > xM we have η = 0.
2.3 Hints from two extreme cases
In the absence of social influence the problem is simple because after introduction of j = 0
in (14) we obtain s = δ which does not depend on η. Then, due to the monotonicity of
cumulative distributions, the fraction of buyers (13) is a monotonically increasing function of δ
(equivalently, at fixed h, a decreasing function of the price p):
η = 1− F (−δ). (17)
Another extreme case is that of a homogeneous population: Hi = H for every i —a sit-
uation obtained in the singular limit σ˜ = 1/j → 0 (the IWP distribution becoming a Dirac
distribution)—. In that case every agent is faced to exactly the same decision problem, so that
at equilibrium either η = 0 or η = 1. For each agent the surplus in case of adoption would be
H−P if no other agent adopt (η = 0), whereas if η = 1 the surplus is H−P +J . In fact, η = 0
is a solution for H < P , while η = 1 is a solution for H > P − J . Hence there is a domain,
P − J < H < P , where the two solutions coexist. The whole population behaves as a single
agent who either does not adopt, η = 0, or adopts, η = 1, with a different surplus depending on
whether he is “in” or “out of” the market: this is analogous to the problem of multi-equilibria
with hysteresis in trade analyzed by Baldwin and Krugman [6], except that here the problem
arises only at the collective level.
We have thus on one side, for J = 0 and σ finite, a unique well behaved equilibrium, and for
J > 0 but σ = 0 a situation of multiequilibria. The question addressed in the following aims
at understanding what happens “in between”. We will show that when the social interaction
strength is large enough compared to the heterogeneity width, the demand faces a complex
problem. More precisely, there is a critical value jB of j = J/σ. Below it, the fraction of buyers
(equation (13)) follows monotonically the price variations. Beyond jB , equation (13) presents
multiple solutions. Among them, the (possibly multiple) Nash equilibria are those solutions
that have an economic meaning, i.e. for which the demand decreases when prices increase.
The Section 3 of the paper is devoted to a detailed study of the nature of the solutions
of equations (13) and (14) with j ≥ 0 for distributions satisfying very general smoothness
hypotheses, detailed in the next section.
2.4 The idiosyncratic willingness-to-pay distribution
Since we are interested in the generic properties of the model, we explicit the general charac-
teristics of the idiosyncratic willingness-to-pay (IWP) distributions covered by our analysis.
Since a pdf must be integrable, f(x) (equation (1) ) must vanish in the limits x → ±∞.
For sufficiently regular pdfs, this can happen in two different ways: either the pdf decreases
continuously to 0 as x → ±∞, or it is strictly zero outside some compact support [xm, xM ].
Most of the analysis in this paper is restricted to the class of pdfs obeying to the following
hypotheses:
H1. Modality: f is unimodal, that is it has a unique maximum
fB ≡ sup
x
f(x). (18)
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H2. Smoothness: f is non zero, continuous, and at least piecewise twice continuously differ-
entiable inside its support, ]xm, xM [ , where xm and xM may be finite or equal to ±∞.
In the latter case f is stricly monotonically decreasing towards zero as x→ ±∞.
H3. Boundedness: the maximum of f , fB (that may be reached at xm or xM if these numbers
are finite), is finite:
fB <∞ (19)
Within the class of pdfs satisfying H1, H2 and H3, we will consider more specifically the
important following prototypical cases:
1. Unbounded supports: The support of the distribution is the real axis; the pdf is continuous
and twice continuously derivable on ] −∞,∞[, with a unique maximum. A typical ex-
ample, relevant to economics (see e.g. [1]), is given by the logistic distribution, although
more generally we do not assume that the pdf is symmetric. We make the following
supplementary hypothesis, that amount to impose that the pdf decreases fast enough for
x→ ±∞:
H4. Mean value: the pdf has a finite mean value. Then, the smoothness condition H2
imposes that f decreases when x→ ±∞ faster than |x|−1.
H5. Variance: the pdf has a finite variance. Then, the smoothness condition H2 imposes
that f decreases when x→ ±∞ faster than |x|−2.
2. Compact supports: the support of the distribution is some interval [xm, xM ], with xm and
xM finite; the pdf is continuous on [xm, xM ] and continuously derivable on ]xm, xM [, with
a unique maximum on [xm, xM ]. Note that, since f has zero mean, xm < 0 < xM .
Hypothesis H2 and H3 exclude cases where the pdf is not a function but a distribution —
containing, e.g., a Dirac delta —. Clearly, if the pdf’s support is the real line, ] − ∞,+∞[,
the boundedness hypothesis H3 is a consequence of the smoothness hypothesis H2. In the
case of compact supports, H3 excludes pdfs diverging at a boundary of the support. Although
hypothesis H3 is actually true under H2 if f is continuous on the closed interval [xm, xM ], we
explicit it because some of our results are valid under H3 even for pdfs less regular than those
satisfying H2.
Although hypothesis H5 is not necessary for the study of the aggregate demand, it corre-
sponds to a wide family of realistic distributions for which one can conveniently use the standard
deviation as the unit for measuring the relevant parameters (i.e., using normalization (10)).
Generic results for unbounded support pdfs satisfying H1 to H5 are presented in the main
body of the paper. They extend previous results obtained for a logistic distribution [66]. The
analysis of other types of pdfs is left to Appendix A:
- In Appendix A.1 we present general results for bounded support pdfs. The case of a
uniform distribution on a finite interval [xm, xM ], which corresponds to an interesting
degenerate case (f is maximal at every point within the interval), has been presented
elsewhere [45]. The particular case of general a triangular pdf is explicitly worked out for
illustration.
- In Appendix A.2 we extend the analysis to fat-tail distributions, which correspond to
an important limiting case of pdfs with infinite variance (for such distributions, the nor-
malization constant σ in (1) and in equations (10) and (11) is no longer the standard
deviation, but an arbitrary positive constant setting the units of H, J , P and C).
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- Finally, in Appendix A.3 we extend the discussion to the case of multimodal pdfs (distri-
butions with an arbitrary number of maxima): we derive the demand phase diagram for
a generic smooth multimodal pdf and we discuss the case of a singular pdf using as an
illustrative example a pdf with two Dirac peaks.
3 Aggregate choices and coordination dilemma
In this section we discuss the demand function, that is the relationship between price p and
fraction of buyers (or adopters, in non market contexts) η, expressed by equation (13). As
we have already seen, this means studying the relationship between η and the bare surplus
δ = h− p, and how it depends on the externality parameter j. We show that, for a large range
of values of the parameters j and δ, the demand presents two equilibria which can be qualified
as Nash equilibria from a game-theoretic point of view. This result is valid for any pdf satisfying
the general hypothesis described in the preceding section.
3.1 The direct and inverse demand functions
The expected demand ηd at a given value of δ is obtained as the implicit solution of (13) and
(14). As we will see, the application η → 1 − F (−s(η)) may be a multiply valued function
of η; it is thus preferable to express δ, or p = h − δ, as a function of η, and determine the
inverse demand function pd(η), that is, the price at which exactly Nη units of the good would
be bought3.
Under the hypothesis H2 the cumulative distribution F is a continuous and strictly mono-
tonic function on ]xm, xM [ and has a unique inflexion point. Hence it is invertible. Denoting Γ
the inverse of 1− F (−s), we have the following equivalence:
η = 1− F (−s) ⇐⇒ s = Γ(η), (20)
with s defined by (14). For unbounded supports, Γ(η) increases monotonically from −∞ to +∞
when η goes from 0 to 1 (see figure 1 for an example, and Appendix A for other cases). In the
case of a compact support [xm, xM ], Γ(η) takes the finite values, Γ(0) = −xM , and Γ(1) = −xm
for η respectively 0 and 1. Note that neither we assume f to be symmetric nor to have its
maximum at x = 0.
Replacing s in the r.h.s. of (20) by its expression (14) yields
δ = D(j; η), (21)
with
D(j; η) ≡ Γ(η)− jη. (22)
Interestingly, D(j; η) depends on the parameter j but not on h. Actually, in Section 3.2 and in
Appendix A.3, we will have to consider D(j; η) as a function of the two variables, j and η. In
the present subsection however, we consider D(j; η) as a function of the single variable η, with
j as a (fixed) parameter - hence according to our convention on notations introduced in Section
2.1, we keep in mind the dependency of D on j by writing D(j; η), and derivatives of D(j; η)
with respect to η are denoted D′(j; η).
Plots of D(j; η) against η for different values of j are presented on figure 2 for the logistic
distribution. Solutions to (21) correspond to the intersections of these functions with horizontal
lines at y = δ.
3In non market models, where generally p = 0, results in this section give the aggregate choice Nηd(j, h) as
a function of j and h. This is the relationship between the fraction of adopters, the average willingness to adopt
of the population and the strength of the social interactions.
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Figure 1: Γ(η) and derivatives as a function of η for the logistic pdf of unitary variance. Remark:
all these functions diverge at η = 0 and at η = 1.
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Figure 2: D(j; η) as a function of η in the case of a logistic distribution of the IWP, for three
values of j: j = 1 < jB, j = jB = 2.20532 and j = 5 > jB.
14
The stable equilibrium values of the demand satisfy
D′(j; η) ≥ 0. (23)
Thus, the intersections of y = δ with D when D′ < 0 correspond to unstable equilibria and will
be ignored, as explained below.
Given an externality parameter j and a given value of δ, the solution η = ηd(j; δ) of equation
(21) satisfying (23) gives the expected demand Nηd(j; δ) at a price p = h− δ.
From the definition of δ and (22), the inverse demand function is thus
pd(η) = h−D(j; η). (24)
This function depends on both parameters h and j, and when necessary we will write pd(η) =
pd(h, j; η).
As we will see, the demand ηd(j; δ) can be a multivalued function of δ for some range of
parameters. On the contrary, since the function Γ(η) is a uniquely defined function of η, so is
D(j; η). This is the reason why, instead of considering (13), we prefer to obtain the properties
of the demand ηd(j; δ) from the analysis of equations (21) and (22).
Under assumption H2, Γ(η) is at least piecewise three times continuously derivable on ]0, 1[;
its derivative Γ′ is continuous and strictly positive. In particular, at any point η in ]0, 1[, we
have:
D′(j; η) = Γ′(η)− j. (25)
In the case of a compact support, the above equation also holds for the right and left derivatives
at, respectively, η = 0 and η = 1.
In terms of the pdf f ,
Γ′(η) =
1
f(−s) , with s = Γ(η). (26)
Under H1, Γ′ has a unique absolute minimum (qualitatively there is a unique point where the
curvature of Γ changes from convex to concave; if Γ is smooth, it has a unique inflexion point).
Thus
min
η
Γ′(η) =
1
fB
> 0. (27)
This minimum is reached at some value η = ηB :
ηB ≡ arg min
η
Γ′(η). (28)
If f is smooth enough at its maximum, then Γ′′(ηB) = 0: ηB is the inflexion point of Γ. For
symmetric pdfs, ηB = 1/2, but we do not restrict to this case.
As a consequence of the properties of Γ(η), we see from equation (25) that D′(j; η) is strictly
positive for j < jB , with
jB ≡ Γ′(ηB) = 1
fB
. (29)
The value jB separates two regions where the model presents qualitatively different behav-
iors. When j < jB , the function D(j; η) is strictly increasing from −∞ to +∞ as η goes from
0 to 1. As a result it is invertible: for any δ in ]−∞,+∞[, equation (21) has a unique solution
ηd(δ).
If j > jB , there is a range of values of δ for which (21) has several solutions.
The existence of multiple solutions in the demand is thus a generic property of discrete choice
models with heterogeneous agents and social interactions (externalities). This is true whatever
the number of maxima of f , as shown in Section A.3 of Appendix A. Actually, the domain
where there is a unique solution, that is 0 ≤ j ≤ jB = 1/fB , is very narrow if fB is large: a
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Figure 3: Demand ηd(j; δ) as function of δ ≡ h− p in the case of a logistic distribution of the
IWP, for three values of j: j = 1 < jB, j = jB = 2.20532 and j = 5 > jB. Notice that the
origin of the horizontal axis (δ = 0) corresponds to h = p. Remark that prices increase from
right to left. Unstable solutions: the negative slope curve joining (δL(j), ηL(j)) to (δU (j), ηU (j))
for j = 5 is not shown.
leptokurtic distribution will have in general a narrower domain of unicity of the demand than
a platykurtic distribution of same variance.
In our case of unimodal pdfs, equation (21) may have three solutions for j > jB (see
figure 2). The intermediate solution, laying on a branch with D′(j; η) < 0 —where η increases
as δ = h − p decreases— is sometimes called a critical mass point in the literature [77]: it
corresponds to a demand that would increase for increasing prices. Hence, in a tatonnement
dynamics, this corresponds to an unstable solution separating the basins of attraction of the
two stable equilibria. The marginal case, j = jB , is a bifurcation point (hence the subscript B)
where multiple solutions to (21) appear on increasing j. The stable equilibria of the demand
that satisfy (23) are represented against δ on figure 3.
3.2 Demand phase diagram
3.2.1 The demand multiple-solution region
Let us consider more in details the behavior of the application δ → ηd(δ) in the case of a
smooth unimodal pdf on ]−∞,+∞[. Considerations specific to compact support pdfs are left
to Section A.1 of Appendix A.
The functions Γ(η) corresponding to pdfs satisfying H1 to H5 are at least three times con-
tinuously derivable on ]0, 1[, and diverge towards −∞ and +∞ as η goes to 0 and 1 respectively.
We have already seen that for j < jB there is a unique solution, and ηd goes from 0 to 1 as
δ = h− p goes smoothly from −∞ to +∞.
For j > jB , (21) has 3 solutions whenever δU < δ < δL (see figure 2), where δL and δU are
the values of δ that satisfy the equality (marginal stability condition) in equation (23). That
is, the boundaries of the region with multiple solutions are the values for which D(j; η) has a
16
horizontal slope (see figure 2):
D′(j; η) = 0 (30)
which is equivalent to
dpd(η)
dη
= 0. (31)
Considering the definition (22) of D, this means that on these boundaries D(j, η(j)), as a
function of j, is the Legendre transform of Γ(η). Under our hypothesis H1, Γ′ has a unique
minimum, and necessarily tends towards +∞ as η goes to either 0 or 1; Γ is strictly convex on
]ηB , 1[, and strictly concave on ]0, ηB [, hence the Legendre transform is well defined and unique
on each one of these intervals: equation (30) for j > jB has indeed two solutions ηL(j) and
ηU (j), given by
j = Γ′(ηΛ), Λ = U,L. (32)
with
ηL(j) < ηB < ηU (j). (33)
From the knowledge of ηU (j) and ηL(j), using (21) one gets the marginal stability curves
δU (j) and δL(j), that is, the extreme values of δ bounding the region where multiple solutions
exist:
δΛ(j) = D(j; ηΛ(j)) = Γ(ηΛ(j))− jηΛ(j), Λ = U,L. (34)
As already stated, for δU (j) < δ < δL(j), equation (21) has three solutions. The curve
ηd(j; δ) has two stable branches (see figure 3): an upper one ηdU (j; δ) with η
d
U (j; δ) > ηU (j) > ηB ,
and a lower one ηdL(j; δ) with η
d
L(j; δ) < ηL(j) < ηB ; they are joined by a branch of unstable
solutions —the above mentioned set of unstable equilibria (see figure 3)—. The upper branch
exists for δ ≥ δU (j), the lower one for δ ≤ δL(j). At the end points dη
d
dδ |L,U = ∞. In other
words, solutions with large fractions of buyers, i.e. high-η solutions, only exist for δ ≥ δU (j)
whereas low-η solutions exist only if δ ≤ δL(j). Since δU (j) ≤ δL(j), the system has multiple
solutions for the demand ηd whenever δU (j) ≤ δ ≤ δL(j).
For j = jB , these marginal stability curves merge at a single (degenerate) point δL(jB) =
δU (jB) = δB with
δB ≡ −Γ′(ηB) ηB + Γ(ηB) (35)
This defines the bifurcation point B in the (j, δ) plane,
B ≡ {jB , δB}. (36)
One should note that ηU,L(j) and δU,L(j), which depend on j (and on the function Γ(.)), are
independent of h and p.
3.2.2 Generic properties
In fact, the preceding analysis can be made more general because the main results may be
obtained only based on the continuity and the convexity properties of Γ, without assuming any
smoothness properties of the derivatives of f . Let us consider this alternative.
First, whatever the smoothness properties of f , the demand ηd must be a decreasing function
of the price: the economically acceptable values of the equilibrium demand, ηd ∈ [0, 1], have
to increase when δ increases (p decreases). Thus, among the solutions of (21), the equilibria
lie on the branches where D (defined by equation (22)), is an increasing function of η (for
differentiable pdfs, this condition is given by equation (23) ).
Next, let us analyze D(j; η) as a function of η (see figure 2). By continuity of the function
Γ(η), D(j; η) is a continuous function of η ∈ [0, 1]. As η → 0, D → −∞, and as η → 1,
D → +∞. Since Γ is concave on ]0, ηB ], on increasing η from 0 within [0, ηB ], D(j, η) has
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Figure 4: Demand phase diagram on the plane (j = J/σ, δ = (H − P )/σ), for a smooth
IWP distribution (here the logistic). In the shaded region the demand presents multiple Nash
equilibria. Outside this region, the demand is a single valued function of j and δ.
a maximum, δL(j), on this interval. δL(j) is by definition the Legendre transform of Γ(η)
restricted to ]0, ηB ]. For η ≥ ηB , Γ is convex, and thus D(j, η) has a minimum δU (j) on [ηB , 1],
which is the Legendre transform of Γ(η) restricted to [ηB , 1[. Beyond this minimum, D(j; η)
increases with η.
Now, for j < jB , the maximum on [0, ηB ] and the minimum on [ηB , 1] of D(j; η) are both
reached at ηB , hence D(j; η) increases monotonically as a function of η ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
the solutions ηd to equation (21) are unique monotonically increasing functions of δ for each j.
As a result, the inverse demand (24) is a uniquely defined continuously decreasing function of
η ∈ [0, 1].
For j > jB , the maximum δL(j) is reached at η = ηL(j) ∈]0, ηB [. Beyond this maximum,
D(j; η) decreases as η increases. The minimum δU (j) is reached at η = ηU (j) ∈]ηB , 1[: there
is an intermediate interval ]ηL(j), ηU (j)[ containing ηB where D(j; η) decreases with η, from
δL to δU . No value of η within this interval can be a stable economic equilibrium. Hence,
for δ ranging between these extrema of D(j; η) the demand ηd(j; δ) as a function of δ has two
branches, a lower one for δ ≤ δL, with ηdL(j; δ) ≤ ηL(j) < ηB and and an upper one for δ ≥ δU ,
with ηdU (j; δ) ≥ ηU (j) > ηB .
In the case of a continuously differentiable function, the preceding results are recovered,
since the Legendre transforms —the above mentioned minimum and maximum of D(j; η) for
j > jB— are reached at the values of η solutions of (30). All this discussion based on convexity
arguments can be extended to multimodal pdfs, that is to cases where the distributions of the
IWPs have more than one maximum. This is done in Appendix A.3.
3.2.3 The phase diagram
The results of the preceding section may be summarized on a customers phase diagram in the
plane (j, δ), where we represent the boundary of the multiple solutions region, as in figure
4. These boundaries are the functions δΛ(j), (Λ = L,U) defined by equations (34), which
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Figure 5: Demand phase diagram in the plane (σ˜ = σ/J, δ˜ = (H − P )/J), for a smooth IWP
distribution (here the logistic). Inside the dashed region the demand presents multiple Nash
equilibria. Outside this region, the demand is a single valued function of σ˜ and δ˜.
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are the two branches of the Legendre transform of Γ(η), one for η < ηB and the other for
η > ηB . Note that in term of prices, the extreme values δL(j) and δU (j) correspond to prices
pL(j, h) < pU (j, h) given by
pΛ(j, h) = h− δΛ(j), Λ = U,L. (37)
By construction of the Legendre transforms, the branch δ = δU (j) is concave, and the branch
δ = δL(j) is convex. In addition, under the smoothness hypothesis, along each branch of the
multiple solutions region in the phase diagram:
dδΛ(j)
dj
=
dD(j, ηΛ(j))
dj
= −ηΛ(j), ; Λ ∈ {L,U}. (38)
This property may be easily checked by deriving (34) with respect to j and making use of
(32). This means that the tangents to the boundaries have a slope given by the value of η
that is marginally stable on the corresponding boundary (i.e. by the η value of the solution
which appears/disappears as one crosses the boundary). Consequently, in the phase diagram,
the width along the δ-axis of the multiple solutions region increases with j as a result of the
convexity properties of the functions δΛ(j), (Λ = L,U). This may also be seen from (33), since
the slope of the L boundary (the one corresponding to ηL) is larger than that of the U boundary
(defined through ηU ). At the bifurcation point B, these two boundaries merge, and, according
to (38), have a common slope −ηB .
Referring back to figure 2, upon increasing δ from −∞, we have the following picture: if
j < jB , the fraction η increases smoothly from 0 and reaches its upper value 1 for δ → ∞.
That is, to each value of the bare surplus δ, —or each value of the average willingness to adopt,
in non-market situations— corresponds a unique fraction of buyers/adopters. In the phase
diagram, figure 4, these solutions lie on the white region. On the other hand, if j > jB , when δ
reaches the value δU (j), a second, high-η solution appears besides the low-η one. These solutions
co-exist for δU (j) ≤ δ ≤ δL(j). The low-η solution disappears when δ increases beyond δL(j),
leaving only the high-η solution. The parameter values for which there are multiple equilibria
is the grey region of the phase diagram, figure 4. Notice that in this region, there exists a third
solution that we neglected because it corresponds to the unstable situation where the demand
would increase with the price (or decrease with the bare surplus).
As mentioned in Section 2.2, it is also useful to consider the same results in terms of the
parameters σ˜ = σ/J and δ˜ = (H − P )/J (see (12). The phase diagram in the plane (σ˜, δ˜)
is shown on figure 5. For large heterogeneity (σ/J larger than σ˜B ≡ 1/jB), there is a single
smooth solution. For weak enough heterogeneity (σ˜B < 1/jB), there is a domain with multiple
solutions. In the limit σ˜ → 0, one recovers the simple results for a homogeneous population, as
briefly discussed Section 2.3.
3.2.4 Vicinity of the bifurcation point
The vicinity of the bifurcation point B in the phase diagram is of particular interest. Under the
smoothness assumption H2, we can study analytically its properties. Let us consider j = jB + 
with 0 <  << 1. Expanding (32) about jB , remembering that Γ′′(ηB) = 0, one gets, to the
lowest order in , the singular behavior
ηdL,U = ηB ±
√
2
Γ′′′(ηB)
1/2, (39a)
δL,U (j) = Γ(ηB)− ηB jB − ηB∓ 23
√
2
Γ′′′(ηB)
3/2. (39b)
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The above singular behaviors are typical examples of scaling properties which are universal:
the same scaling is obtained for any smooth distribution. From studies in statistical physics one
expects the exponents (e.g., here, 1/2 for the behavior of η) to depend mainly on the structure of
the network of interactions: the exponents would be different at the analogous critical point for
the model with agents situated on the vertices of a d-dimensional square lattice and interacting
only with their nearest neighbors. Typically the exponents depend on d up to some critical
dimension dc, above which they become identical to the “mean-field” exponents, which are
those obtained here with the global neighborhood. For the present model, other universal
scaling properties have been obtained, in relation with the hysteresis effects [80], and these
have been used in order to analyze empirical socio-economics data [65]. In a related work (with
a generalization of the model to more than two choices), Borghesi and Bouchaud [16] analyze
empirical data for which the social strength can be estimated, and is found to be close to the
critical value (the analogous of jB).
In [44], where we consider the supply side, it will be seen that the bifurcation point B =
{jB , δB} in the (j, δ) plane gives a singular point {jB , hB ≡ δB} in the (j, h) plane which plays
an important role in the phase diagram associated to the optimal strategy for the monopolist.
3.2.5 Pareto optimality and coordination
Each one of the equilibria ηd(j; δ) discussed in the preceding section is a Nash equilibrium for
the customers, at a posted price p. In this section we show that, whenever multiple solutions
exist, that is for j > jB , the solution with the largest η is Pareto optimal. This is the solution
ηd(j; δ) that satisfies ηd(j; δ) ≥ ηU (j).
Let us recall that if a customer i decides to buy, it is because his (normalized) surplus
si = δ + jη + xi, (40)
is positive. When si < 0 he doesn’t buy and his surplus vanishes. Thus, his actual surplus is
wi = siωi (see Section 2).
Consider now the two equilibria ηd(j; δ) in the region δU (j) < δ < δL(j) (see the curve
D(j; η) for j = 5 on figure 2). Let’s denote by ηdL(j; δ) the low-η equilibrium (ηdL(j; δ) ≤ ηL(j)),
and by ηdU (j; δ) the high-η equilibrium (ηU (j) ≤ ηdU (j; δ)). In either equilibrium, the agents who
buy are those with xi > −δ− jηd(j; δ). Since ηdL(j; δ) < ηdU (j; δ), agents with xi < −δ− jηdU (j)
are not buyers in any of the equilibria whereas agents with xi > −δ − jηdL(j) are buyers in
both equilibria. Those with −δ − jηdU (j) < xi < −δ − jηdL(j) are buyers only in the high-
η equilibrium, and their utility is thus larger (strictly positive instead of zero) in that case.
Moreover, even those agents that would buy in both cases have a larger surplus if the realized
equilibrium is the high-η one. Hence, in the high-η equilibrium all these agents have a larger
surplus than in the low-η one. This situation with two possible Nash equilibria, where the
strictly dominant one may be risk dominated, is reminiscent of coordination problems in game
theory. For a detailed analysis of this analogy see Phan and Semeshenko [74]. The present
analysis shows that coordination problems may arise in systems with heterogeneous agents
whenever the externalities are strong enough.
Whether a Nash equilibrium —and which one in the case of multiple equilibria— is actually
realized depends on the rationality of the agents and the information they have access to.
In the context of bounded rationality and of repeated choices, a natural hypothesis is that
agents estimate what will be the fraction of adopters, and may base their estimate on previous
observations. In this paper we will not discuss these issues, that we are currently analyzing.
Some partial results (dynamics with myopic agents and with various reinforcement learning
paradigms) are discussed elsewhere [45, 79].
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Figure 6: Inverse demand p − h (= −δ) as a function of η for different externality strength
values j, illustrated on the case of a logistic IWP distribution.
3.3 Summary of the generic customers’ model
To summarize this section, if the social influence is small enough to satisfy the condition j < jB ,
at each value of the bare surplus δ = h − p, which measures the gap between the population
average willingness to pay and the price, there is a unique solution ηd(j; δ) to equation (21).
This demand is a monotonic increasing function of δ. However, if the social influence is large
enough (j > jB), there is a range of values δU (j) ≤ δ ≤ δL(j) for which two different (stable)
solutions exist, a high demand one (ηd(j; δ) ≥ ηU (j) > ηB) and a low demand one (ηd(j; δ) ≤
ηL(j) < ηB). In this region, the customers are faced with a coordination problem. If δ is
modified dynamically within this range, the demand may jump abruptly between these two
solutions, a situation analogous to so called first order phase transitions in physics. Outside
the range [δU (j), δL(j)], there is a single solution, like in the small j case.
We showed that the threshold jB , which corresponds to the onset of a bifurcation in the
customers phase diagram, is determined by the maximum fB of the IWP pdf: jB = 1/fB .
Although most of the analysis has been done for smooth pdfs, we have shown that the generic
behavior stems only from convexity properties of the function Γ(η), that is from the fact that
the pdf f(x) is strictly increasing for x < xB and strictly decreasing for x > xB , where xB is
the mode of f .
Some specific properties which arise for distributions with compact support are discussed in
appendix A.1, and the case of distributions with infinite variance is studied in appendix A.2.
In appendix A.3 we extend the results of this section to multimodal distributions.
In market contexts (and in particular for the market analysis of [44]), it is useful to consider
the inverse demand pd instead of δ, as in standard approaches. In figure 6 we plot the values
of δ = p− h as a function of the demand η and the strength j of the social externality for the
case of a logistic distribution.
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4 Conclusion and perspectives
The model of collective behavior considered in this paper, under the general hypothesis detailed
in Section 2, may be declined in both non-economic and economic contexts. In the first case,
one is interested in the fraction of adopters, which corresponds to studying the demand function
for an exogenous price in the second case.
Like in many other models in the recent literature, we consider optimizing agents making
binary choices, with willingnesses to adopt that depend additively on an idiosyncratic part
(IWP) and on the choices of other agents. The population is intrinsically heterogeneous: the
IWPs are drawn from some distribution of mean H and variance σ2. In contrast with other
most studied models, here the idiosyncratic willingness-to-adopt heterogeneity is frozen: it
does not result from (time varying) random shocks. In other words, each agent’s choice is
deterministic with a well known (to him) IWP, and we concentrate on the aggregate behaviors.
We analyze the equilibrium properties (Nash equilibria) characterized by the emergence of a
collective behavior resulting from the combined effect of externalities and heterogeneity.
Our results, for global uniform interactions —a global social influence of uniform strength—
in the limit of an infinite population —through the application of the central limit theorem—
are summarized on phase diagrams. The axes of a phase diagram are the relevant model
parameters. In the case of the demand, the parameters are: δ, the bare surplus (that is, in
the economic context, the gap between the average IWP and the posted price), and j, the
social influence strength, both parameters being measured in units of the standard deviation
σ of the idiosyncratic term distribution (see 2.2). In this space of parameters, one draws
the boundaries between regions (“phases”) of qualitatively different collective behaviors. The
boundaries, where “phase transitions” occur, are lines of non-analyticity (e.g. the demand is
discontinuous on the boundary). In our problem, the main feature characterizing a given region
is the number of equilibria in this region.
From a constructivist point of view, our model encompasses the classical downward sloping
demand curve as a particular case. Indeed, one of the main results for the demand is that, for
very general IWP distributions, there is a region in the phase diagram with multiple equilibria.
More precisely, if the IWP distribution is mono-modal, there are two Nash equilibria for any j
larger than a distribution-dependent value jB . For smaller values of j, the (Marshallian) demand
curves are, ceteris paribus, downward sloping (i.e. monotonically decreasing with increasing
prices). For large externality strengths (j > jB), when the population average willingness to
pay is small enough, the demand becomes not-monotonic (as in Becker’s example [9]). This is
a very general property of the model with additive externalities, and does not depend on the
particular statistical distribution of the idiosyncratic preferences. We also discuss (although
more briefly) the results for multimodal distributions —for which there exist several regions
with multiple equilibria, with possibly more than two equlibria for some of them—, and present
detailed analysis of many illustrative examples.
An important contribution of this paper is to exhibit the detailed properties of the bound-
aries of the regions (in the parameters space) where multiple solutions exist. These properties
are generic, in that they depend only on qualitative features of the IWP distribution.
Future work may extend the results presented in this paper in several directions. First, the
individual preferences may include a stochastic (noise) term like in [36, 33, 94, 19, 13, 14, 67, 4],
on top of the idiosyncratic one. Second, the present paper concentrates on the equilibrium
properties – that may be considered as the “static” analysis of long term equilibria in the
Marshallian tradition. Further studies should focus on the process that makes the system
reach one or the other of the possible equilibria. A first study, implying revision of beliefs
in an repeated choice setting, has already been published [79]: in the region with multiple
equilibria, interesting complex dynamics occur with a large family of different equilibria being
reached, depending on the particular learning rule used by the agents. Third, literature on
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marketing and studies of social psychology shows that choices very often depend on imitation
effects or social influence. For example, the existence of externalities in the Communication
and Information Technologies (CIT) sector is well established, and may result in a multiplicity
of equilibria [76]. This may arise in other sectors also. Yet, empirical and econometric studies
allowing identification of the corresponding preferences distributions and the strength of the
social influence are lacking [15]. Fourth, the influence of social networks topologies deserves
further attention. Ioannides [50] reported results for the “Thurnstone model, i.e. homogeneous
IWP and stochastic (logistic) choices, mainly for tree-like and one-dimensional networks with
nearest-neighbor interactions. It would be interesting to explore how the phase diagrams for
the model considered here —heterogeneous IWPs and deterministic choices— are affected by
short range interactions. Analytical and simulation studies on the RFIM [80, 73] show that
the heterogeneity introduces hysteretic effects in the dynamics, with interesting path-dependant
properties (return-point memory effect [80]). A statistical method to calculate the return points
exactly, starting from an arbitrary initial state, has been recently proposed [82] for the simple
case of a one dimensional periodic network with nearest-neighbor interactions (called cyclic
topology in [50]). The impact of such properties on both individual and collective economic
behavior remains to be investigated.
In a companion paper [44], we will discuss within the market context the profit optimization
by a monopolist fixing the price. Other extensions of the results of this second part involve the
study of how, with repeated choices, the long term equilibria depend on the entangled dynamics
where customers and monopolist learn from each other. Finally, at least two directions are
worth to be explored: the case of an oligopolistic competition and the consequences of Coase
conjecture in the case of choices with externalities involving a durable good – an issue already
addressed in the literature [61], but not yet in the regime where multiple equilibria exist.
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Figure 7: Triangular pdf of unitary variance and a maximum at xB = −1. Left: Γ(η) and its
first derivative. Right: D(j; η) for different values of j. The values of ηL, δL, ηU and δU are
represented for the particular value j = 5.
A Appendix: Demand for other distributions
In this Appendix we extend our analysis to more general distributions.
We first (A.1) explicit the particularities introduced on the above generic results when the
pdf has a bounded support. In Section A.2 we relax hypothesis H5, and consider pdfs with
unbounded support called fat tail distributions in the literature. Finally, we extend our results
to multimodal distributions in Section A.3.
A.1 Pdfs with compact support
We consider here pdfs f(x) with compact supports: x ∈ [xm, xM ] presenting a unique maxi-
mum (which may be located at one boundary). Clearly, such pdfs have finite variances. The
discussion follows the same lines as that of the generic smooth distributions, except that in
addition one has to pay attention to the values of Γ and its derivatives at the boundaries η = 0,
η = 1. A simple uniform distribution, analyzed in [45], is a particular case where the maximum
of the pdf is degenerate.
In this section, derivatives like Γ′(1) or Γ′(0), stand for the left and the right derivative of
Γ at η = 1 and η = 0, respectively. Due to the fact that the pdf strictly vanishes beyond its
support, if the price is very high with respect to h (small δ) there may be no buyers at all,
and η = 0. On the contrary, if the price is very low (large δ) the market may or not saturate,
i.e. η = 1, depending on the behaviour of the pdf in the vicinity of xm. We represent the
lines delimiting the regions where these solutions exist on the phase diagram. It should be
stressed that these lines only indicate saturation and non-existence of a market. Their nature
is different from that of the boundaries δL and δU . In the following we consider a triangular
distribution with a maximum fB at xB to illustrate our general results. The figures in this
section correspond to xB = −1, i.e. a case where the maximum lies inside the support. The
case xB = xm has been considered in the study of the learning dynamics [79].
In the case of compact supports [xm, xM ], Γ(η) increases from Γ(0) = −xM < 0, to Γ(1) =
−xm > 0. Like in the generic case of unbounded supports, Γ′ reaches a minimum at ηB , and
there is a critical value jB = 1/fB beyond which multiple solutions appear. Notice that if
the maximum of the pdf lies at xm or at xM , ηB lies at one of the boundaries of the [0, 1]
interval. As already shown in Section 3.1, if the pdf is symmetric —as is the case for the
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uniform distribution—, ηB = 1/2.
In our example of a triangular pdf with maximum at xB we have:
f(x) =
{
2(x−xm)
(xM−xm)(xB−xm) if xm ≤ x ≤ xB ,
2(xM−x)
(xM−xm)(xM−xB) if xB ≤ x ≤ xM ,
(A-1)
with f(x) = 0 outside the support. At its maximum, fB = 2/(xM − xm). The constraint of
zero mean and unit variance imposes a relationship between the support boundaries and the
value of xB : xm = (−xB −
√
3(8− x2B))/2, xM = (−xB +
√
3(8− x2B))/2.
If xB = xM the distribution increases monotonically from 0 at xm, reaching its maximum
at xM , and is defined only by the first equation in (A-1). Conversely, if xB = xm then f(x)
decreases inside its support, and is defined by the second equation in (A-1). In both cases, f(x)
presents a discontinuity at one boundary of its support.
The function Γ and its first derivative for the triangular distribution are respectively
Γ(η) =
{ −xM +√(xM − xm)(xM − xB)η if 0 ≤ η ≤ ηB
−xm −
√
(xM − xm)(xB − xm)(1− η) if ηB ≤ η ≤ 1 (A-2)
and
Γ′(η) =

√
(xM−xm)(xM−xB)
2
√
η if 0 ≤ η ≤ ηB√
(xM−xm)(xB−xm)
2
√
(1−η) if ηB ≤ η ≤ 1
(A-3)
where ηB = (xM −xB)/(xM −xm) is the inflexion point of Γ. They are represented on figure 7
(left) for the particular value xB = −1. Notice that Γ′′(η) is discontinuous at ηB , because the
maximum of f(x) is a cusp.
The corresponding inverse demand function D(j; η) (equation (22 ) ) is represented on figure
7 (right). Due to the finite range of the compact support, there are two new particular values
of δ: δ0 ≡ D(j; 0) = Γ(0) = −xM , independent of j, and δ1(j) ≡ D(j; 1) = Γ(1)− j = −xm− j:
for δ < δ0, η = 0 (no-market) is a solution, while for δ > δ1(j) there is a solution η = 1 (market
saturation). These extreme values of η may be reached upon finite values of δ (i.e. finite prices
and finite average IWP) only in the case of compact supports.
For j < jB , D(j; η) is strictly increasing and invertible on ]0, 1[: for any δ in ]−xM ,−xm−j[,
equation (21) has a unique solution ηd(δ) 6= {0, 1}. One can easily check that j < jB implies
j ≤ xM − xm, so that −xM < −xm − j and consequently D(j; 0) < D(j; 1). In the particular
case where f is the uniform distribution, one has precisely jB = xM − xm. For the triangular
pdf (A-1), (29) gives jB = (xM −xm)/2, the support’s half-width. Thus, for δ0 < δ < δ1(j) the
fraction of buyers/adopters is a monotonic increasing function of δ. For δ < δ0, η = 0, and for
δ > δ1(j) the market saturates (η = 1).
For j > jB there are two stable solutions whenever δU (j) ≤ δ ≤ δL(j). Due to the existence
of the extreme solutions η = 0 and η = 1, the analysis is more cumbersome than for infinite
supports. If the maximum of the pdf lies inside the support, the solutions ηL(j) and ηU (j)
of equation (30) lie in ]0, 1[ and δU (j) and δL(j) both satisfy D′ = 0. On increasing δ from
−∞, there is no demand until δ = min{δ0, δU (j)}. If δ0 < δU (j), when δ increases beyond δ0
the demand becomes finite and remains unique provided that δ0 < δ < δU (j). For δ > δU (j)
we enter the region of multiple solutions. On the other hand, if δ0 > δU (j), the system steps
directly from the no-demand solution into a region where a finite demand equilibrium with
η > ηB coexists with the no-demand one. Notice that the high-η solution may correspond
to either a fraction of buyers strictly smaller than 1 (if δL(j) < δ1(j)) or to saturation (if
δL(j) > δ1(j)). In the case of the triangular distribution it is straightforward to check that the
multiple solutions region sets in at jB = (xM − xm)/2, δB = xB/2.
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Figure 8: Triangular pdf of unitary variance and a maximum at xB = −1: customers phase
diagram.
If the pdf has its maximum at one of the boundaries of its support, either ηU or ηL coincide
with ηB . More precisely, if xB = xm then ηU = ηB = 1, if xB = xM , ηL = ηB = 0.
Summarizing, the customers phase diagram for pdfs with compact supports have two sup-
plementary lines with respect to that with unbounded supports. They indicate the boundary of
the viability region (no market exists below this line) and the saturation boundary (above which
all the customers are buyers). Figure 8 presents the customers’ phase diagram for our example
corresponding to the triangular pdf of unitary variance (A-1), with a maximum at xB = −1.
A.2 Pdfs with fat tails
Fat-tail distributions are characterized by the fact that the pdf f has a slow decrease at large
values of x, so that the variance is infinite - or even the mean is infinite. Equivalently this
occurs if Γ(η) diverges ’too fast’ to −∞ when η → 0. In the case of the logistic, Γ ∼ log η; for
the Gaussian, Γ ∼ −√−2 log η; for a power law, Γ ∼ − 1
ηb
. This suggest to consider the general
following smooth behavior:
as η → 0: Γ(η) ∼ −K(− log η)a 1
ηb
, (A-4)
with the constant K > 0, a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0 (ab 6= 0). The fat-tail case corresponds then to a = 0
and b ≥ 1 in the above equation (A-4).
A particular example of a fat tail distribution is a pdf with a power law decrease, which for
large x behaves like:
f(x) ∼ x−(1+µ) (A-5)
with µ ≥ 0. Then, for small η, Γ ∼ − 1
ηb
with b = 1/µ, so that b ≥ 1 means µ ≤ 1. For µ < 1,
not only the variance but also the mean value of the random variable x is infinite.
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Figure 9: Γ function and derivatives corresponding to the function (A-6).
For fat-tails distributions one has to look at finite size effects: it is no more possible to
take directly the large N limit and make use of the central limit theorem: quantities like
(1/N)
∑
iG(xi) for any function G will be dominated by rare events, that is by the largest
values encountered in the population of (large but finite) size N . There is, however, no difficulty
in doing this analysis: the results are obtained by doing as if the pdf had a finite support, the
upper bound xM being given as an increasing function of N (for an introduction to statistics
with fat tails, see e.g. [17]).
Since we considered compact supports in the preceding section, we concentrate here on the
marginal case µ = b = 1, which can be analyzed as a limiting case of distributions with infinite
support.
For µ = 1, f(x) does not have a finite variance. Then, the value of σ that defines the
normalized variables (10) may be any (finite) measure of the width of the distribution, as for
example, the value of x at which f(x) is equal to half its maximum. Let us discuss this marginal
case on a simple example (see figure 9):
Γ ≡ −1
η
+
1
1− η , (A-6)
corresponding to the cumulative function:
F (z) =
1
2
− 1
z
+ sgn(z)
√
1
z2
+
1
4
. (A-7)
The corresponding pdf is,
f(x) =
1
x2
[1− 2√
4 + x2
], (A-8)
as represented on figure 10. Since this is a symmetric distribution, ηB = 1/2, and one finds
(see equations (28), (29) and (35) ) that the point B in the customers phase diagram is jB =
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Figure 10: Pdf corresponding to equation (A-8).
Γ′(ηB) = 8, δB = −4. Notice that, like for any monomodal distribution (satisfying thus
hypothesis H1), Γ(η) is convex for η > ηB and concave for η < ηB , with as before ηB being the
inflexion point. The supply function has thus the generic behavior described in Section 3 even
for fat-tail distributions.
A.3 Aggregate demand for multimodal pdfs
A.3.1 Smooth pdfs: generic properties
In this section we consider the behavior of the application δ → ηd(δ) in the case of a smooth
multimodal pdf with support on ] −∞,+∞[. The discussion Section 3.2, based on convexity
arguments, can be extended to describe the phase diagram for the aggregate demand in the
multimodal case.
The minimal hypotheses we consider are the following.
• HA0. The pdf f(x) is continuous with a finite number K ≥ 2 of x-values, −∞ < xKB <
xK−1B < ... < x
1
B <∞, for which f has a (possibly local) bounded maximum,
f(xkB) <∞ k = 1, ...,K. (A-9)
For simplicity we assume also that the pdf is not constant on any interval of finite length.
Actually, the discussion can be easily extended to less regular pdfs (in particular piecewise
continuous pdfs), and pdfs constant on some intervals, but to keep the discussion shorter
will leave that to the interested reader (in the case of a monomodal pdf, see the discussion
on compact supports, and for the bimodal case see also below, Section A.3.2, the singular
case of a distribution composed of two Diracs).
• HA1. When considering smoother functions, we will assume f to be twice continuously
differentiable, so that in particular it has a zero derivative at every maximum and every
minimum.
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Let us denote by xkC the location of the minimum between x
k+1
B and x
k
B . We assume f > 0
everywhere on its support except possibly at some minima, and f(x) goes to zero as x→ ±∞.
By convention we set x0C = +∞ and xKC = −∞ (and we may write f(x0C) = f(xKC ) = 0).
In the monomodal case, we have seen that the critical value of j for the appearance of several
solutions is jB = 1/f(xB). Here we will see that the relevant critical values are
jkB ≡
1
f(xkB)
k = 1, ...,K (A-10)
and also
jkC ≡
1
f(xkC)
k = 1, ...,K − 1 (A-11)
(and it will be convenient to define as well j0C = j
K
C =∞).
Consider now the inverse demand at a given value of j. The ensemble of equilibria δd(η) for
η ∈ [0, 1] is the subset of the ensemble of solutions of (21) for which δ increases (p decreases)
as η increases. As for the monomodal case we study the function of η defined by (21) for
any given j, δ(η) = D(j; η). By continuity of the function Γ, δ(η) is a continuous function of
η ∈ [0, 1]. As η → 0, δ → −∞, and as η → 1, δ → +∞. Increasing η from 0, δ(η) increases.
Similarly, decreasing η from η = 1, δ(η) decreases. Since f(x) is continuous, Γ(η) is continuously
differentiable, with Γ′(η) ≡ dΓ(η)/dη = 1/f(x) at x = −Γ(η). Hence Γ′(η) has (local) minima
at values of η given by
Γ′(ηkB) =
1
f(xkB)
k = 1, ...,K (A-12)
and (local) maxima at values of η given by
Γ′(ηkC) =
1
f(xkC)
k = 1, ...,K − 1 (A-13)
For a smooth enough pdf, the ηkB and η
k
Cs are inflexion points for Γ. Note that for any k =
1, ...,K, ηk−1C < η
k
B < η
k
C .
The most important remark is that Γ(η) is strictly concave on every interval ]ηk−1C , η
k
B [, k =
1, ...,K, and strictly convex on every interval ]ηkB , η
k
C [, k = 1, ...,K. Then as η varies on
[ηk−1C , η
k
B ], the function D(j, η) = Γ(η)− jη has, at some value ηkL(j), a maximum δkL(j) which
is by definition the Legendre transform of Γ(η) restricted to [ηk−1C , η
k
B ]. Similarly, on [η
k
B , η
k
C ],
D(j, η) has, at some value ηkU (j), a minimum δkU (j), the Legendre transform of Γ(η) restricted
to [ηkB , η
k
C ].
Depending on the value of j compared to the values jkB , j
k
C , these min and max may be
reached either at a boundary of an interval, or in the interior. More precisely:
j < jkB , η
k
L = η
k
U = η
k
B (A-14)
jkB < j < j
k
C , η
k
B < η
k
U < η
k
C (A-15)
jkB < j < j
k−1
C , η
k−1
C < η
k
L < η
k
B (A-16)
jkC < j, η
k+1
L = η
k
U = η
k
C (A-17)
(and ηkU increases from η
k
B to η
k
C as j increases from j
k
B to j
k
C , whereas η
k
L decreases from η
k
B
to ηk−1C as j increases from j
k
B to j
k−1
C ). In the case of a continuously differentiable pdf, every
Legendre transform ηkΛ(j), Λ = L,U satisfies the marginal stability equation,
∂D(j, η)
∂η
|η=ηkΛ(j) = 0. (A-18)
One should note that ηkU,L and δ
k
U,L depend on j (and on the function Γ(.)), but not on h or p.
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Now for j < jB ≡ mink jkB , every min and max are reached at the corresponding value ηkB :
this means that there is no intermediate regime with a decreasing behavior of δ(η) as η increases,
hence δd(η) = D(j, η), uniquely defined, is a continuously increasing function of η ∈ [0, 1]. For
j > jB , there is at least one k where the maximum δkL(j) is reached for η = η
k
L(j) < η
k
B , and
the minimum δkU (j) is reached for η = η
k
U (j) > η
k
B , so that there is at least one finite interval of
η on which the function D(j, η) decreases with η, and thus does not correspond to an economic
equilibrium. Hence the demand ηd(δ) has at least two branches.
In the plane (j, δ), the boundaries of the multiple solutions regions are thus given by the
fonctions δkΛ(j) = D(j, ηkΛ(j)), Λ = L,U , which are the graphs of all the branches of the
Legendre transform of Γ. By construction of the Legendre transform, every branch δ = δkU (j)
is a concave curve, and every branch δ = δkL(j) is a convex curve, and, under the smoothness
hypothesis HA1, along each branch Λ = L,U ,
dδkΛ(j)
dj
=
dD(j, ηkΛ(j))
dj
= −ηkΛ(j). (A-19)
Recall that ηkΛ is the value of η for the solution which is marginally stable on this boundary.
These boundaries can be easily drawn for any distribution making use of a parameterization
by s (or equivalently x ≡ −s): from the basic equations η = 1−F (−s) where F is the cumulative
of the pdf f , s = Γ(η), and Γ′(η) = 1/f(−s); with the marginal stability condition (A-18)
which gives j = Γ′(η), the locus of marginal stability is then given in the plane (j, δ) by the
parameterized curve
for x ∈ support(f),
j = 1/f(x) (A-20)
δ = −x− 1− F (x)
f(x)
(A-21)
This is this representation that we have used to draw the phase diagram, figure 12, for the
particular example of the bimodal distribution shown on figure 11.
The domain of multiple solutions can then be described as follows. The phase diagram is a
kind of superposition of diagrams associated to mono-modal phase diagrams, every maximum
(every ’bump’ in the pdf) k being responsible of the appearance of a domain of multistability:
when j becomes larger than jkB , a continuous solution split into two solutions, with a lower
solution ηd(j, δ) ≤ ηkL(j) < ηkB and δ ≤ δkL, and an upper one with ηd(j, δ) ≥ ηkU (j) > ηkB and
δ ≥ δkU (see figure 12). When j becomes larger than jkC , this bump is no more ’seen’. Since
a minimum of the pdf, if not at a boundary, is in between two maxima, such an intermediate
solution may exist either because of one bump or the other - or both.
The branch δ = δkU (j) has thus as left end point, B
k ≡ (jkB , δkB = D(jkB , ηkB)), and as right
endpoint (if jkC is finite), C
k ≡ (jkC , δkC = D(jkC , ηkC)). Bk is the merging point of δkU and δkL,
and Ck the merging point of δkU and δ
k+1
L . Since δ
k
L and δ
k+1
L must be both above δ
k
U , these
two branches must intersect one another for some value of j = jkBC between j
k
B and j
k
C : there
is thus coexistence of three solutions in the triangular-like domain bounded below by δkU (or
max(δkU , δ
k+1
U ) if B
k is below the branch δk+1U ), and above by δ
k
L for j ≤ jkBC , and by δk+1L for
j ≥ jkBC .
In the smooth case (HA1), at every bifurcation point Bk, resp. Ck where two boundaries
merge, according to A-19 there is a common slope −ηkB , resp. −ηkC .
One may say that the pdf is probed at different scales for different values of j. Consider
the graph y = f(x). Every maximum below the line y = 1/j is not seen (it does not change
the structure of the solution), whereas a set of maxima higher than 1/j, but joined by minima
where f is still higher than 1/j, is seen as a single global bump. This gives in particular that for
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Figure 11: An example of bimodal pdf.
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Figure 12: Phase diagram (aggregate demand) for the case of the smooth bimodal pdf shown on
figure 11.
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Figure 13: Examples of multimodal pdfs. At a given value of j = J/σ, the qualitative properties
are obtained by looking at the intersection of the horizontal line y = 1/j with the graph of the
pdf, y = f(x): for the particular value of j corresponding to the horizontal line on this figure,
the two pdfs lead to the same qualitative properties of the Demand.
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Figure 14: Phase diagram (aggregate demand) for the case of a bimodal pdf composed of two
Dirac peaks.
j > jB , the number of solutions is equal to one plus the number of times the line y = 1/j cut
the graph y = f(x) at points where f is increasing. Note that this does not give the number of
solutions for a given value of δ. On figure 13, two pdfs are shown; the intersection of the graph
y = f(x) with the line y = 1/j gives the structure of the demand at this particular value of j
(in the case illustrated on the figure, the demand has 3 solutions for the two pdfs).
A.3.2 A degenerate case: 2 Dirac
Let us consider the particular case of an IWP distribution given by two Delta pics: xi = ±x0
with equal probability (x0 = 1/
√
2 since the variance of f is normalized to 1). For j = 0, one
has clearly η = 0, 1/2 or 1 depending on δ < −x0, −x0 < δ < +x0 or δ > x0. For j > 0,
obviously η can still take only these three values. One gets easily the domain of existence and
stability of these solutions, η = 0, 1/2, 1, by direct inspection of the equation (13). The resulting
phase diagram is shown on figure 14.
This phase diagram for a singular distribution can also be understood by comparison with
the predicted phase diagram for a continuous distribution. In the present case, the two maxima
have equal height, +∞, which gives j1B = j2B = 0, in agreement with the fact that boundary
lines meet at j = 0. The minimum between the two maxima is at f = 0, hence jC = ∞: the
domain of stability of the intermediate solution η = 1/2 extends to infinity, as it is the case
whenever a minimum is at f(x1C) = 0. The marginal stability lines are straight lines - hence,
marginally concave and convex curves -, with slopes 0, 1/2 and 1 corresponding to the values of
the solution marginally stable on the boundary, in agreement with (A-19). Since here there is
no continuity in the demand at the singular points B1 = (0,−1), B2 = (0, 1), two branches do
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not merge with a common slope: besides the fact that the demand can take only three values,
this is the only place where the non smoothness of the pdf gives a feature of the phase diagram
qualitatively different from what is obtained for a smooth pdf.
42
